Contests with rank-order spillovers

This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision variable. These effects arise in natural interpretations of a number of important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals exhibit inequality aversion or regret. We provide the closed-form solution for the symmetric Nash equilibria of this class of games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R&D races, models of litigation, and a host of other contests

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

A common feature of animal populations is the stealing by animals of resources such as food from other animals. This has previously been the subject of a range of modelling approaches, one of which is the so called "producer-scrounger" model. In this model a producer finds a resource that takes some time to be consumed, and some time later a (generally) conspecific scrounger discovers the producer with its resource and potentially attempts to steal it. In this paper we consider a variant of this scenario where each individual can choose to invest an amount of energy into this contest, and the level of investment of each individual determines the probability of it winning the contest, but also the additional cost it has to bear. We analyse the model for a specific set of cost functions and maximum investment levels and show how the evolutionarily stable behaviour depends upon them. In particular we see that for high levels of maximum investment, the producer keeps the resource without a fight for concave cost functions, but for convex functions the scrounger obtains the resource (albeit at some cost)

Demographic and indication-specific characteristics have limited association with social network engagement: evidence from 24,954 members of four health care support groups

Background: Digital health social networks (DHSNs) are widespread, and the consensus is that they contribute to wellness by offering social support and knowledge sharing. The success of a DHSN is based on the number of participants and their consistent creation of externalities through the generation of new content. To promote network growth, it would be helpful to identify characteristics of superusers or actors who create value by generating positive network externalities. Objective: The aim of the study was to investigate the feasibility of developing predictive models that identify potential superusers in real time. This study examined associations between posting behavior, 4 demographic variables, and 20 indication-specific variables. Methods: Data were extracted from the custom structured query language (SQL) databases of 4 digital health behavior change interventions with DHSNs. Of these, 2 were designed to assist in the treatment of addictions (problem drinking and smoking cessation), and 2 for mental health (depressive disorder, panic disorder). To analyze posting behavior, 10 models were developed, and negative binomial regressions were conducted to examine associations between number of posts, and demographic and indication-specific variables. Results: The DHSNs varied in number of days active (3658-5210), number of registrants (5049-52,396), number of actors (1085-8452), and number of posts (16,231-521,997). In the sample, all 10 models had low R2 values (.013-.086) with limited statistically significant demographic and indication-specific variables. Conclusions: Very few variables were associated with social network engagement. Although some variables were statistically significant, they did not appear to be practically significant. Based on the large number of study participants, variation in DHSN theme, and extensive time-period, we did not find strong evidence that demographic characteristics or indication severity sufficiently explain the variability in number of posts per actor. Researchers should investigate alternative models that identify superusers or other individuals who create social network externalities

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction

We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all semi-symmetric equilibria. There are two types of equilibria: (1) each player in the best-shot group puts mass at the upper bound of the support, whereas each player in the other group puts mass at the lower bound of the support; (2) players in the best-shot group put masses at both the lower and the upper bounds, while the other group randomizes without a mass point. An earlier and longer version of this study was circulated under the title “The Group All-pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions.” We appreciate the comments of an Associate Editor and two anonymous referees, Kyung Hwan Baik, Walter Enders, Matt Van Essen, Paan Jindapon, David Malueg, Paul Pecorino, Seth Streitmatter, Ted Turocy, the participants at the 2015 conference of ‘Contest: Theory and Evidence’ at the University of East Anglia, and the seminar participants at the University of Alabama and Korea University. Iryna Topolyan gratefully acknowledges the support from the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center. Any remaining errors are our own

Sabotage in Contests: A Survey

A contest is a situation in which individuals expend irretrievable resources to win valuable prize(s). ‘Sabotage’ is a deliberate and costly act of damaging a rival’s' likelihood of winning the contest. Sabotage can be observed in, e.g., sports, war, promotion tournaments, political or marketing campaigns. In this article, we provide a model and various perspectives on such sabotage activities and review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests. We discuss the theories and evidence highlighting the means of sabotage, why sabotage occurs, and the effects of sabotage on individual players and on overall welfare, along with possible mechanisms to reduce sabotage. We note that most sabotage activities are aimed at the ablest player, the possibility of sabotage reduces productive effort exerted by the players, and sabotage may lessen the effectiveness of public policies, such as affirmative action, or information revelation in contests. We discuss various policies that a designer may employ to counteract sabotage activities. We conclude by pointing out some areas of future research

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour involving simultaneous decisions and variable investment levels

In the “producer–scrounger” model, a producer discovers a resource and is in turn discovered by a second individual, the scrounger, who attempts to steal it. This resource can be food or a territory, and in some situations, potentially divisible. In a previous paper we considered a producer and scrounger competing for an indivisible resource, where each individual could choose the level of energy that they would invest in the contest. The higher the investment, the higher the probability of success, but also the higher the costs incurred in the contest. In that paper decisions were sequential with the scrounger choosing their strategy before the producer. In this paper we consider a version of the game where decisions are made simultaneously. For the same cost functions as before, we analyse this case in detail, and then make comparisons between the two cases. Finally we discuss some real examples with potentially variable and asymmetric energetic investments, including intraspecific contests amongst spiders and amongst parasitoid wasps. In the case of the spiders, detailed estimates of energetic expenditure are available which demonstrate the asymmetric values assumed in our models. For the wasps the value of the resource can affect the probabilities of success of the defender and attacker, and differential energetic investment can be inferred. In general for real populations energy usage varies markedly depending upon crucial parameters extrinsic to the individual such as resource value and intrinsic ones such as age, and is thus an important factor to consider when modelling

Platelet Activating Factor Blocks Interkinetic Nuclear Migration in Retinal Progenitors through an Arrest of the Cell Cycle at the S/G2 Transition

Nuclear migration is regulated by the LIS1 protein, which is the regulatory subunit of platelet activating factor (PAF) acetyl-hydrolase, an enzyme complex that inactivates the lipid mediator PAF. Among other functions, PAF modulates cell proliferation, but its effects upon mechanisms of the cell cycle are unknown. Here we show that PAF inhibited interkinetic nuclear migration (IKNM) in retinal proliferating progenitors. The lipid did not, however, affect the velocity of nuclear migration in cells that escaped IKNM blockade. The effect depended on the PAF receptor, Erk and p38 pathways and Chk1. PAF induced no cell death, nor a reduction in nucleotide incorporation, which rules out an intra-S checkpoint. Notwithstanding, the expected increase in cyclin B1 content during G2-phase was prevented in the proliferating cells. We conclude that PAF blocks interkinetic nuclear migration in retinal progenitor cells through an unusual arrest of the cell cycle at the transition from S to G2 phases. These data suggest the operation, in the developing retina, of a checkpoint that monitors the transition from S to G2 phases of the cell cycle